I'm not a bot



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Plato was a Greek philosopher who came up with a lotof interesting ways to viewthe world. Many people have different ways of viewing the world, and that is wonderful for keeping the world anything but mundane. Though, Plato also came up with a variety ofinteresting quotes to explain life and how people may interpret it. His take on the
worldfascinated people because it was different. He told the truth.RELATED:23 Inspiring (And Hopeful!) Quotes About What Makes A GREAT ManHis quotes have been an inspiration to millions of people around the world to help them get through hard times and uplift them. As a wise man, Plato wanted people to look outside of the box, discover
something new and take their own wisdom away from what he said to better people to get into writing has inspired people through his quotes and life out their best lives through his quotes and life out their best lives through his quotes and life out their best lives through his quotes and life out their best. Plato was good at not telling people directly
what the quotes are aboutand, instead, making them into a riddle so people can find out what his quotes meanon their own. Everyone can find their own way of interpreting his quotes that relatesto you? Determining what that quote means in your life can help you learn more
about the world. Everybody has a story, and each of the quotes tells a storyin a way that can relate to the human condition, what people wantto say about the world and how the world can change. Plato wanted toopen people's mindsto the possibility of seeing things in a new manner. Platoquotes can tell you a lotabout
yourself and how you handle people in your life. Reading quotes from Plato and other philosophers encouragespeople to do better in their everyday life and to be empathetic to other people. Waking up and reading inspirational memes and quotes with deep meaningswill make you feel morein touchwith the world and the people around you. Changing
the world doesn'talways stem from Plato'ssayings, but his teachings should encourage you to impact people in a way that is progressive and influential. Plato changed the world and people's view of society, and that gave people a voice that had been silenced. He gave people another point of view. So hopefully these quotes about knowledge will open
your mind body and soul to new opportunities and freedoms that you have never encountered before. 1. The truth is always the best option. "Truth is the beginning of every good to the gods." PlatoRELATED: 50 Life Ouotes From Famous Philosophers To Inspire And Motivate You Every Single Day 2. Wisdom is the formula for everything and every
situation. "Wisdom is the science of every science." Plato 3. Learning can sometimes be a memory game and not actually a learning is a process of recollection. "Plato 4. Suffering is part of life. "Only the dead have seen the end of war." Plato 5. It is easy to do harm, but not so easy to do good. "Any man
can easily do harm but not every man can do good." Plato 8. Justice can be determined by different factors. "Knowledge is true opinion." Plato 7. Getting something well done is better than nothing. "Better a little which is well done than a great deal imperfectly." Plato 8. Justice can be found by minding your own business. "Justice means minding one's
own business and not meddling with other man's concern." PlatoRELATED:50 Love Quotes Guaranteed To Make You Feel Things9. Life is most lived when it is lived like a play. "Love is a serious mental disease." Plato11. Love can make
everybody a romantic." At the touch of love everyone becomes a poet." Plato12. People would rather not engage in politics is that you end up being governed by your inferiors." Plato13. Going out and exploring life is worth it. "The unexamined life is not worth living to a human." Plato14.
Material items aren't asimportantto people as peoplethink they are. "No human thing is of serious importance." Plato 15. Children can see their own faults, but grown adults cannot. "We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light." Plato 16. Life is derived from these three sources. "Human
behavior flows from three main sources: desire, emotion, and knowledge." PlatoRELATED:40 Best Encouraging Quotes To Pick You Up When You're Feeling Down And Depressed17. Be kind to people because you don'tknow what they are going through." Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a harder battle." Plato18. Education should focus on
the beautiful aspects and not be so mundane. "The object of education is to teach us to love what is beautiful." Plato 19. Teaching children by force or harshness; but direct them to it by what amuses their minds, so that you may be better able to discover with accuracy the peculiar
bent of the genius of each. "Plato20. Thinking feeds the soul." Thinking feeds the soul with oneself. "Plato21. Do not discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track. "Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track. "Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track. "Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track. "Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in their life because they are on the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes great strides in the right track." Never discourage anyone who makes gr
mythology, humans were originally created with four arms, four legs and a head with two faces. Fearing their other halves." Plato23. The beginning of anything is the framework for everything that you do in life. "The beginning is the most important
part of the work." Plato24. Repeating a good thing in your life, no matter what it is, is always a good thing to do. "There is no harm in repeating a good thing." PlatoRELATED:40 Sweet Love Quotes That Will Make You Believe In Love25. Being yourselfis noble. "For a man to conquer himself is the first and noblest of all victories." Plato26. Indulgence
can lead to people's downfalls. "The excessive increase in anything causes a reaction in the opposite direction." Plato27. Music is a moral law. It gives soul to the universe, wings to the mind, flight to the imagination, and charm and gaiety to life and to everything. "Plato28. False claims and rumors are evil." False words are not
only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. "Plato 29. Positive actions lead to positive results." Good actions in others." Plato 31. Books are
the gateway to exploring andknowledge in life. "Books give a soul to the universe, wings to the mind, flight to the imagination, and life to everything." Plato32. Ifknowledge becomes evil if the aim be not virtuous. "PlatoRELATED: How To Answer Your Kid's Toughest Questions About News & Politics Like A
Pro33. Writing opensup the door to creativity and expression for a human being's soul. "Writing is the geometry of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? Surely, I said, knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Knowledge will surely feed your soul, not a man. "And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato34. Need inspires innovation. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Need in the mother of invention. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Need in the mother of invention. "Necessity is the mother of invention." Plato35. Need invention. "Need invention." Plato35. Need invention. "Need invention." Plato35. Need invention. "Need inventio
Plato36. Knowing what you fear makes you a better person. "Courage is knowing what not to fear." Plato37. Relationships are important. "When two friends, like you and me, are in the mood to chat, we have to go about it in a gentler and more dialectical way. By more dialectical, I mean not only that we give real responses, but that we base our
responses solely on what the interlocutor admits that he himself knows." Plato38. Education can be the reason for your success or failure. "The direction in which education starts a man will determine his future in life." Plato39. Knowledge must be desired to be retained. "Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does not harm to the body; but knowledge
which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind. "Plato40. The truth is not always welcome." No one is more hated than he who speaks the truth." PlatoRELATED:6 Most Philosophical Zodiac Signs Who Think Deeply About Everything for the best quotes and memes to share with the people you love (or just want to
feel inspired yourself) ... look no further! From the sweetest love quotes, inspirational sayings, and hilarious friendship truths, we've got you covered. When shes not writing, she enjoys spending her time reading romance novels. "The Individual, the State, and
Education "Summary: Book IIThrasymachus, Polymarchus, and the others having gone on to enjoy the festival, Socrates demonstrate that justice is worthy of pursuit as both an end and as a means to an end, offers to play devil's advocate and
oppose his friend in order to resolve the debate once and for all. Socrates cheerfully accepts Glaucon's first assertion, according to the popular definition, is that justice done unto oneself. He relates an allegory of a shepherd who discovers a
magic ring. The ring grants its wearer invisibility. Once the shepherd recognizes its powers, he seduces the queen of the kingdom and overthrows the ruler. After his allegory, Glaucon proposes an experiment in which two men, one perfectly just and the other perfectly unjust, are, in public, perceived antithetically. Then, speaking for the first time,
Adeimantus supplies a rich litany of poetic and other sources that seem to confirm the superiority of injustice, although, like his brother, he believes but cannot prove the opposite. Socrates accepts the challenge humbly, as usual. Socrates commences his refutation. Here, he suggests a new method: they will examine the role of justice in the State,
then in the individual. First, however, they must undertake the construction of a viable State, i.e., the Republic. The first task is to identify the fundamental needs of man: food, shelter, clothing; and to assure they are sufficiently provided. Next is the division of labor, or the structure by which these necessities are to be provided, along with a
rudimentary system of trade to satisfy the needs the State cannot satisfy itself. Finally, Socrates arrives at the nature of the relations between men, where he finds his question once again. A brief digression occurs when Glaucon objects to the austerity of Socrates' State. Socrates considers a more luxurious State, but it is summarily dismissed as a
result of excess and greed, war is inevitable. From war, the dialogue telescopes more closely on the security of the State, its quardians, and their education. Socrates' prohibits what he terms, "bad fiction," that is, poetry and literature of dubious moral value, from the early education of the quardians. He also establishes certain principles pertaining to
the gods: first, "that God is not the author of all things, but of good only;" and, second, that "he is one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image." Book Two concludes with Socrates' further explication of the State's theology and later the ratification of its principles into law. Analysis: Book IIThe dialogue of the second book is more an
intellectual exercise than the previous book, since Glaucon takes a position contrary to his own (in fact, it is Thrasymachus') for the sake of argument, and so that they might arrive at a more satisfying conclusion. Therefore, he poses the allegory of the shepherd. The allegory suggests that, magically freed of legal/social responsibility (invisibility), any
man would act unjustly and seek power. Adeimantus' injection of poetry from Aeschylus, Hesiod, and Homer as endorsing the rewards and relative ease of injustice over justice complements his brother's legalistic argument. He is drawing on their shared cultural tradition, in which he can find no convincing example of justice pursued as an end in
itself and not merely as a means, in this life or the next, to an end. The deceptive, disappointing worth of poetry is a theme to be explored in depth later (the final conclusion occurs in Book X). What he wants from Socrates is "the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them." Socrates in the explored in depth later (the final conclusion occurs in Book X).
first of the construction of a State in which justice will be tried against injustice, and, second, of the trial of the proper origin of the Republica state that arises "out of the needs of mankind." The assumption (and it is one) is extremely important; it shall be the foundation of the Republic. In
order to ensure the basic needs of man, Socrates would assign each man in his burgeoning State a single occupation that suits his natural inclination, instead of leave every man to work separately for his every need. Furthermore, these occupations would be done at the right time in order to avoid waste. The division in the education of the quardians
of the State, between music and gymnastics, was traditional even in classical antiquity. It probably represents the archaic notion of the mind/body schism. Noteworthy is Socrates' prohibition on fiction, or at least on poorly composed fictions.
Although he provisionally accepts fiction with an explicit moral, he condemns all poetry and literature, even parts of Homer and Hesiod, that depicts an undesirable or fallacious story. Socrates believes that in youth the guardians should be protected as much as possible from untruths they cannot evaluate critically for themselves. The problem with
this position seems to be its one-sidedness. Working to curb lies and harmful fictions is admirable, but complete eradication is impossible, right? Normally, we think of fiction as conveying new information before it can be digested rationally and evaluated morally. It thus seems more realistic to debunk "bad fiction" for the young guardians, explain its
who scarcely resembles Zeus or any other Olympian. Instead, his God is the origin of all things, complete, immutable, perfect, as we shall later read justice. This accepted, it is easier to understand how Socrates can separate
God from evil; his position is that evil appears only in the manifest, in the limited sense, and certainly not in the ideal, where we find God. That these principles are made law is nothing less than revolutionary; it discredits nearly all of Classical Greek mythology and folklore. But that, as we know, is hardly the realm of pure reason and truth; and if it is
not beyond reproach, it cannot possibly be permitted to shore the State's theology, nor serve as the origin of its laws. We're getting everything ready for you. The page is loading, and you'll be on your way in just a few moments. Thanks for your patience! Socrates hopes that the issue of justice has been settled once and for all. No such luck. (Are you
surprised?) Glaucon jumps in and wants to talk about the good. He outlines three ways in which things can be good everyone likes simply for its own sake and because we get something out of it (like wages for
work) Socrates agrees with this breakdown, so Glaucon asks him into which category justice would fall. Socrates says justice belongs in the second category, since it's something they only do because 1) they think they have to and 2) they want to have a good
reputation. Glaucon really wants to hear Socrates praise justice entirely for its own sake and not for the sake of its consequences. Even though he believes justice is better than injustice, he's going to play the devil's advocate and defend injustice. Brain bite! Devil's advocate? That's just a fancy way of saying that someone is going to take an extreme
opposite opinion in an argument more for the sake of the argument than because that person truly holds those extreme feelings. Glaucon has an agenda. He's going to return to Thrasymachus's line of argumentation and 1) define justice and where it comes from; 2) demonstrate that everyone who acts justly does so "unwillingly, as necessary but not
good" (358c); and 3) demonstrate that the unjust are better off than the just. Got all that? Socrates is down. Glaucon explains that justice came to exist not because it's something good to do, but because even though everyone wants to do unjust things, they're terrified of having unjust things done to them. So, in order to protect themselves, people
made a kind of social contract or agreement to be just. Glaucon insists, however, that if people weren't afraid of the implications of having injustice done to them, no one would be just. Glaucon tells a story about a man who finds a ring and realizes that, depending on which way he turns it, he can become invisible. Glaucon tells how this
man, when he realizes he can do whatever he wants without being caught, acts unjustly all the time and lives a very happy and successful life, cutting corners and pretty much just doing whatever he wants. Brain bite: Does this little story sound a bit familiar? As in, Middle Earth familiar? It should: J.R.R. Tolkien got his inspiration for The Hobbit and
The Lord of the Rings from this little story in Plato (we told you this book was important). Glaucon goes on to imagine two men, one very just and one very unjust, while the unjust man will be adored and admired, and people will constantly believe him.
to be just. Why? Because the unjust man will always have an advantage: he will do whatever it takes to get ahead, whereas the just man will become ruler of the city, he'll marry a great lady, and he'll have great business
opportunities, lots of money, good friends, tons of appealing sacrifices to the gods... you get the idea. Glaucon's brother, Adeimantus, jumps in and says that Glaucon has missed something crucial. Adeimantus, jumps in and says that the reason why injustice so often appears to be better than justice is because the
nature of justice and injustice are 1) poorly taught by parents and educators and 2) poorly represented in poetry and literature. Justice is poorly taught by parents because even though they tell their children to be just, they defend it only in terms of the good things that come from having a reputation for being just: money, honors, etc. Justice is poorly
represented in poetry because poets are always moaning about the trials and tribulations of living a just and virtuous life while also telling stories about bad guys and villains who do well and end up unpunished. In fact, lots of poets even represent the gods themselves as indifferent to justice; all they seem to care about are some good
sacrifices. Between justice and status or advantage, how can anyone come to think justice is better? Children end up thinking that gaining an advantage in life is the most important thing, so once they see that if they can get away with injustice they'll do way better, that's what they do. And that's completely reinforced by the poetry they're
reading. Adeimantus concludes that the issue here is that justice and goodness are always discussed in terms of 1) what they provide you with in life and 2) how seeming to be just or good, instead of actually being those things, is all that matters. This is why Adeimantus wants Socrates to defend justice on its own terms, not by what you can gain from
it. He wants Socrates to explain why it is inherently good for your soul, regardless of whether anyone, god or man, knows or sees how you are acting. No one, until now, he says, has ever talked about this. Well, Socrates is impressed. He thinks these are pretty amazing arguments, and he is almost almost a loss how to respond to such persuasive
thinking. But, of course, Socrates doesn't actually believe injustice is better than justice, so it's up to him to find out a convincing argument to explain why. Socrates doesn't actually believe injustice in terms of individuals, who are small and therefore harder to
scrutinize. Socrates imagines that thinking about something bigger, like a city, would make it easier to think about this idea of justice." [369a). Adeimantus thinks that's likely, so they decide that's exactly
what they're going to do. Socrates believes that a city comes about because people can't survive on their own and need to form communities. The most urgent needs of a city are: 1) food 2) housing, and 3) clothing. In order to have all those things, they decide they will need a minimum of four to five people to be a farmer, builder, shoemaker, weaver
and so on. They then agree that it is easier and more efficient if each person in the city specializes in one thing that they produce for everyone instead of trying to do a little bit of everything just for themselves. They also agree that this means more people will have to be added to the city, since each specialized job requires helpers and specific
tools. There will also need to be trade, both within the city and between cities, so merchants and tradesmen will also be necessary, as well as the production of surplus materials in order to trade. Socrates asks where justice fits into this city, and Adeimantus suggests it must have something to do with the way various people relate to one another
Socrates agrees but first wants to think more basically about day-to-day life. The guys paint a picture of a thriving, well-fed city, where people enjoy not only sustenance but a few luxuries as well. These luxuries multiply, so the number of various people enjoy not only sustenance but a few luxuries as well. These luxuries as well. These luxuries multiply, so the number of various people enjoy not only sustenance but a few luxuries as well. These luxuries as well. The luxur
servants, doctors, and others. The guys imagine that the city will now be too small for all these new people, so they will need more land. How will they get it? They'll have to go to war with other cities. So you guessed it: the city now needs an army, too. Socrates says that warfare is just as much a craft as anything else, so the soldiers must also be
specialists. What the guys come to realize is that the single most important thing they need to decide is who will rule the city, since this job will be the most specialized. Socrates calls these rulers guardians. They first conclude that the guys come to realize is that the single most important thing they need to decide is who will rule the city, since this job will be the most specialized. Socrates calls these rulers guardians. They also
conclude that the guardians can't be aggressive toward one another either; they need to be restrained and mild to their own people and harsh to their enemies. The gang is at a bit at a loss when they try to find someone who might combine both energy and good sense, until Socrates suggests they return to the image of a dog, since dogs are always
friendly toward those they trust and aggressive toward strangers. Socrates takes this a step further and suggests that there is something philosophical about dogs because they base their actions on what they know and do not know: they love and are kind to what they know and are unkind to what they don't know. Socrates says this is how a
philosopher should be: he loves learning and doesn't love ignorance. This means, therefore, that the guardian must be a philosophers. Socrates for that big leap from dogs to philosopher should be: he loves learning and doesn't love ignorance. This means, therefore, that this
line of thinking will definitely relate back to the theme of justice (you know, one of these days). They decide that the first thing that should be taught is the art of speeches; that's more important than either music or athletics. Socrates is
essentially talking about what we would call stories), since little children are always first told stories. However, Socrates notes that childhood is a very impressionable children are taught. In fact, he thinks they ought to regulate the kinds of stories
mothers tell their children, and he imagines that most of the popular stories told to children in Greece at that time will have to be banned. Wait, what? Banned? Why? Because in most of these stories (that would be, like, every Greek myth ever), the actions of gods and heroes are neither noble nor admirable; they're ridiculous, violent, and mean. If kids
think this kind of stuff is heroic, the city will be a disaster. Kids will think it's okay to turn on their fathers, make war for no reason, have sex before marriage... Socrates explains that even if these myths might have a deeper, less offensive meaning, children won't be able to understand that, so no one should tell stories like this. Poets, Socrates says
will be instructed to write and perform stories that make virtue appealing and good. Adeimantus wants a bit more detail. What's the right way, he asks, to represent a god? Socrates says that a god should be represented as completely good, since that should be represented as completely good, since that should be represent a god? Socrates says that a god should be represented as completely good, since that should be represented as completely good.
produce good and not evil, they are only responsible for good things and shouldn't be portrayed as causing evil things. Socrates goes through a whole list of quotations from Homer and Aeschylus that show gods involved in evil, so those parts will have to be banned. Socrates also says that these stories shouldn't represent the gods always sneaking
around and changing form. Since the best things are the things that are most stable (and therefore change the least), the gods definitely wouldn't be constantly changing and lying in wait. Finally, Socrates says that gods can't be
represented as lying, because lying is inherently bad and only acceptable in certain situations, such as: dealing with enemies and is too all knowing to need a story to help him understand the world, so gods just
don't need to lie at all. close specified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question 'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins by dividing goods into three
classes: first, goods desirable in themselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the three classes he would place justice. In the second class, replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves; and also for their results. 'Then the world in
general are of another mind, for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only. Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus which he rejects.
injustice in themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view. To do injustice is said to be a good
to suffer injustice an evil. As the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that
the just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them invisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one will do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their
hearts (Cp. Gorgias.)'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting them; having gifts of money, speech, strengththe greatest villain bearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his nobleness and simplicitybeing, not
seemingwithout name or rewardclothed in his justice onlythe best of men who is thought to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injusticethey will tell you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified
(literally impaled) and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, tra
better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.'I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already unequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had been omitted: Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; parents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other
 advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages and high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and
Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival, with garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough and make them carry water in a sieve: and in this life they attribute to them the infamy which
Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be unjust. 'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose: "Virtue," as Hesiod says, "is honourable but difficult, vice is easy and profitable." You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant
prophets knock at rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a small charge; they appeal to books professing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the
minds of whole cities, and promise to "get souls out of purgatory;" and if we refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us. When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his conclusion? "Will he," in the language of Pindar, "make justice his high tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?" Justice, he reflects,
without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To appearance then I will turn, I will put on the show of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that "wickedness is not easily concealed," to which I reply that "nothing
great is easy." Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have
no further reward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the sons of the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State. How can we resist such arguments in favour
of injustice? Add good manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds. Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with others; for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a man, and that he only praises
justice who is incapable of injustice. 'The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets, instructors of youth, have always asserted "the temporal dispensation," the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or divine eye, we
 should not have needed others to be our guardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what I want you to show, Socrates; other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that "might is right;" but from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let
the just be thought unjust and the unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice'...The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachusnot right is the interest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same premises he carries the
analysis of society a step further back; might is still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the strength of the few. There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to
govern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that private vices are public benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be
explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or more generally of
governments, is one of the forms under which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from some alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We
 know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to be like himself. And theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which is
based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion), any more than they describe the origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply
on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of
himself and his fellow men. The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox when compared
with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is roughly a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is roughly a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is roughly a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise an ennobling influence as a fact, but they may exercise as a fact, but they m
raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be bound in certain cases to prefer. Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the viewer and which the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer. Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the viewer approves.
implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness' involves
some degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind. Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is the answer and parallel. And still the unjust
must appear just; that is 'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of Thrasymachus
and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question and the position of the positio
themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their condemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the nature of things. It has been objected that justice is
honesty in the sense of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question (Protag.),
 'whether the virtues are one or many,' viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his age and
Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately follows: First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the
difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the
State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this, that under favourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book he claims to have
got rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher 'who retires under the shelter of a wall' can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking
 whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you. 'Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the
individual. First ethics, then politicsthis is the order of ideas to us; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not ONE, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country
or the creed of his church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the individual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek speculation, and even in
modern times retains a certain degree of influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the standard of politics. The
good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation acting upon them from within....Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of the renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand how
they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to
the smaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will then proceed to the individual. Accordingly he begins to construct the State society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on
the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man will do one
thing better than many; and business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different employments; into wholesale and retail trade; into workers, and makers of workmen's tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then
again imports will be required, and imports necessitate exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts
at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of their way of life. They spend their days in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes and produce their
own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with each other, and take care not to have a relish?' Certainly; they will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts to roast at the fire.
"Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied, what do you want more? 'Only the comforts of life,sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.' I see; you want not only a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts must go to workevery conceivable instrument and ornament
of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbour's land, and they will want a part of
ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural
aptitude for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who have this aptitudedogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures who have this aptitudedogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures who have this aptitudedogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight.
to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy,
whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education? But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music
includes literature, and literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. 'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to
unlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as false, and which should never be spoken
of to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to the
narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down
the principles according to which books are to be written; to write them is the duty of others. And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of destinies; or that Athene and Zeus
incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal
fiction which we will allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great principleGod is the author of good only. And the second principle is like unto it: With God is no variableness or change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another? but the best works
of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By himself?but he cannot change for the better; he will hardly change for the better; he will have better the better for the better 
other deities who prowl about at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or principle of
falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional caseswhat need have the gods of their. For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he
deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great principleGod is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus...In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in an
imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the
elements of political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of primitive lifean idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the
other (Politicus); nor can any inference be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We should not interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare the lively fancy of Plato with
the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises on philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the 'mythus is more interesting' (Protag.) Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade;
Adulteration; Wills and Bequests; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato's), Value and Demand; Republic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the Republic. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, and never seems to have recognized that Trade
is one of the great motive powers of the State and of the world. He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he remarks, quaintly enough (Laws), that 'if only the best men and the best women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail trade, etc., then we should knew how
pleasant and agreeable all these things are. The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the ministers of luxury in the ministers of luxury in the mini
when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that
children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only develope gradually, and that there is much which they must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern ethical writers,
respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be 'falsely true,' i.e. speak or act falsely
in support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects. A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his religion was an historical
fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in all religions: the
consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have refused
to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections
tend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions.
We know also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would condemn. We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well
established in the age of Plato, and here, as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was rejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation; and by a natural process,
which when once discovered was always going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the customary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the religion of the philosopher, who was
dwelling in the heaven of ideas, but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism between the popular and philosophical religion, never so great among the Sreeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the
educated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into the 'royal mind' of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became the knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries
before and after Christ. The Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy; having lost their ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, when their influence over the world was waning. A singular conception which occurs towards the
end of the book is the lie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself. For example, to represent
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God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest

untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John), 'he who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation, which he had himself raised about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below he alludes to the 'Chronique Scandaleuse' of the gods. please wait...Although Socrates thinks that the discussion is over, Glaucon continues it, asking Socrates in which class of things he would place justice: things we choose to have for their own sake, for their consequences, or for the sake of their consequences, or for the sake of their consequences only. To this, Socrates answers that justice is in the most beautiful class of all: the class of their consequences only. Tracking: Justice 7 To this, Glaucon answers that most people think otherwise and would classify justice with "the arduous things that ought to be shunned for themselves but pursued for profit and a reputation based on appearance." Book 2, pg. 31, line 358 He also says that he isn't impressed by the discussion. He wants to know what justice and injustice are, and what power they each have by themselves in the soul. Thus, he proposes to first present the popular view of the nature and origin of justice, then show that all who practice it do so unwillingly, and do so because they think of it as a necessity and not a good. Finally, he says that he will argue that this attitude is reasonable since people generally think that the unjust life is better than the just life. He says he does not believe that injustice is good to inflict but bad to suffer. Through experience, people determine that the negative effects of suffering it, and therefore they make a pact to stop inflicting or suffering it, and therefore they make a pact to stop inflicting or suffering it, and therefore they make a pact to stop inflicting or suffering it, and therefore they make a pact to stop inflicting or suffering it. being a midway or compromise, and is thus not cherished as a good but honored out of inability to do wrong. The result is that a real unjust man would never make a pact with anyone because they have to be. To do this, he tells the story of a shepherd who once served a king. One day, when an earthquake occurred, a chasm was opened where he was in a meeting with fellow shepherds, he happened to turn the setting of the ring toward him. Suddenly, he became invisible, and the others started to speak of him as if he wasn't there. After experimenting further, he came to the realization that the ring could make him invisible at will. Thus, he used it to become messenger to the king, seduce the queen, murder the king, and then take the throne. Glaucon says that should there be two rings like this, one given to a just man and one to an unjust man, the just man would not have the will to resist the opportunities, and thus, nobody is willingly just. Furthermore, he says that "justice is practiced only under compulsion, as someone else's good - not our own." Book 2, pg. 33, line 360c Topic Tracking: Justice 8 This shows that everyone really believes that injustice pays better than justice pays better than justice aperfectly unjust man. He again comes to the conclusion that "the unjust man enjoys life better than the just" Book 2, pg. 35, line 362c. The conversation then moves on to a discussion that the whole hypothesis is based on the rewards of appearance and a good reputation, whereas the gods reward those who are truly just and punish those who are unjust. However, it is generally believed that the gods often grant misfortune and evil lives to good men while evil men are happy and successful. Furthermore, priests and soothsayers charge large fees for making others' lives better, erasing sins, and making enemies suffer, and only the rich can afford these people. With stories like these floating around, it is difficult to remain just, especially when perceived as unjust. Therefore, people go about attempting to appear just, regardless of what they truly are. However, it is difficult to appear just. People realize this and, in order to cover their true selves and intentions, form gangs and political societies. They can also have professors teach them techniques for swaying a jury and speaking persuasively. In the end, they will take everything they want. When told that the gods cannot be fooled, they simply answer that there is no proof that such gods exist and so they should not be concerned with the gods. However, should they exist, they can be persuaded to forgive them through feasts and offerings, according to hearsay and the poets, the same people who say that the gods exist. Thus, either way, divine punishment is not something they should be worrying about. Thus, Adeimantus concludes, there is absolutely no reason to prefer justice to injustice. He also asks Socrates what strategy he would use to convince a man who had all the power and means to be unjust, to respect justice. He also asks Socrates what strategy he would use to convince a man who had all the power and means to be unjust, to respect justice. He also asks Socrates what strategy he would use to convince a man who had all the power and means to be unjust, to respect justice. He also asks Socrates what strategy he would use to convince a man who had all the power and means to be unjust, to respect justice. He also asks Socrates what strategy he would use to convince a man who had all the power and means to be unjust, to respect justice. Justice 9 To this, Socrates replies that although it will be a very difficult task, he is willing to try. He begins by creating the following scenario for his audience and asking them if it is true: if a man with poor eyes was asked to read something small at a distance, and he noticed it written larger somewhere else, would he not read the larger one first and then examine the smaller one to see if it was the same? His audience agrees that it is true. Similarly, he says that it would make defining justice and defending it easier if they examine justice in the state first, by watching a city coming into being and identifying justice and injustice as they accordingly come into being. Topic Tracking: Justice 10 Primarily, they agree that a city comes into being because individuals are not self-sufficient. Thus, many people come together to provide for each other, creating a settlement called a city. With this in mind, it can be inferred that people share their products with others because they think such an action is for their own good. Considering just the necessities, a city would be comprised of a farmer for food, a carpenter for shelter and a weaver for clothes. Then they add a few other craftsmen, such as a shoemaker, to help provide for the needs of the body. Thus, the absolutely necessary city will consist of four or five people, where each person has a certain skill and provides the fruits of that skill to everybody in the city to make the tools that he needs, such as a plow for the farmer, and shepherds to provide wool for the weaver. Also, it will be impossible to found this city in a place where it doesn't need imports, therefore servants are needed to bring in the imports. However, they must produce surpluses to sell to other cities. Thus trade comes into existence. People within the city will also start trading, and a marketplace with currency will be built. However, the skilled workers must not waste their time, and therefore retailers are needed, as are wage-earners (slaves). However, the source of injustice cannot be found. Therefore, Socrates goes on to describe what the people will have - the basics of food and clothing. Glaucon stops him and says he is creating a city for pigs, with the bare necessities and no luxuries. Socrates agrees and says that Glaucon is right in assuming that the bare necessities will need to expand, and hairdressers, doctors and teachers, as well as other professionals, will come into existence. Because of this expansion, the city will have to gain land from its neighbors and will soon be at war. Thus, the origin of war is found: the desire for possessions. This means that the city will need an army, since it has already been established that each man is only good at one skill, and warfare is a skill. Through examining the nature of a dog, hostile to strangers, and loving to people they know, they realize that dogs judge things as hostile or friendly only through knowledge and ignorance. Thus, they must also love knowledge, and people who love knowledge are philosophers. Therefore, "to become a good guardian, a man must be by nature fast, strong, and a spirited philosopher." Book 2, pg. 48, line 376e After establishing what the guardian, as this may help them find the roots of justice and injustice. They come up with the time-tested formula: physical training for the body and poetry for the soul. However, since children must be supervised. Also supervised must be the storytellers. In particular, no stories must be told where the gods are depicted poorly, or heroes are misrepresented. Also, guardians must never be told that gods fight with each other, as this may induce fighting between themselves. Thus, the first stories the guardians hear must be well composed for teaching excellence. Topic Tracking: Excellence 3 As for the gods, they must always be represented as their true selves, and since they are truly good, that is how they must be depicted. Since good things cannot be harmful, gods do no harm. Since evil exists, it has to have another cause. With this is mind, no ill-spoken words about the gods, and show that the people deserved it. This leads to the first law of the city: "God is the cause only of good." Book 2, pg. 52, line 380c Furthermore, since gods are the ultimate in beauty and perfection, they would never change themselves into something else, since everything else is worse than they are. Also, since they are the most powerful, nothing else can change them. These two facts lead to the conclusion that gods never change shape or form. Therefore, any poet who says they do must be lying. Also, since gods are all-knowing, they do not need to create fiction about the past in order to achieve an end; therefore, gods would never lie. This leads to the second law of the city: "the gods shall not be misrepresented as sorcerers who change their shapes or as liars who mislead us in word or deed." Book 2, pg. 54, line 383

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